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I
INTRODUMTON
Since 1943 a great deal has been said and written concerning the function of rate
bureaus and conferences in the making of rates to be charged for common carrier
transportation service. Defenders of the rate bureaus have frequently maintained
that the present system of rate conferences must be preserved or chaos and con-
fusion will reign in the making of transportation rates.
These claims are made in response to charges set forth in suits by the Federal
Government and the State of Georgia that railroad rate bureaus were being operated
in contravention of the Sherman Act.' In the Seventy-eighth, Seventy-ninth, and
Eightieth Congresses bills were introduced to exempt interstate carriers regulated by
the Interstate Commerce Commission from the application of the antitrust laws.2
On occasion the Department of Justice has been vigorously criticized for bringing a
suit to enforce the antitrust laws in an area in which it is urged that the Interstate
Commerce Commission should have exclusive jurisdiction. The assertion is made
-hat interference with the present method of operation of rate bureaus and confer-
ences would be disastrous because the rate-bureau procedure is absolutely necessary
and cannot be changed if the carriers are to comply with the Interstate Commerce
Act.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the rate-making process as carried on
through the rate-bureau mechanism to ascertain whether the activities are necessary
for compliance with the Interstate Commerce Act, or whether such activities could
be altered to meet the requirements of the antitrust laws without handicapping the
carriers in their efforts to comply with the Interstate Commerce Act. The process
is termed private rate-making, as opposed to the regulatory rate-making provided for
by statute to be carried on by the Interstate Commerce Commission. While much of
what is written here applies to rate bureaus for other forms of transportation, railroad
rate bureaus will be the topic for discussion and analysis. To attempt to deal with
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the rate-making activities of bureaus in each form of transportation would entail a
discussion too lengthy to be practicable. The fundamental issues are the same and
can be covered by an examination of rail bureaus. The analysis will take into account
the operating regional rate bureaus as well as the appellate machinery superimposed
on them and forming an integral part of the private rate-making procedure.
II
EARLY COURT DECISIONS ON RATE BUREAUs AND THE SHERMAN ACT, AND SUBSEQUENT
ORGANIZATION OF RATE BUREAUS
Before taking up the private rate-making process a brief resume of the experience
of rate bureaus under the Sherman Act will be given, followed by an account of
the organization of the present private rate-making machinery.
In 1889 many of the railroads operating west of the Mississippi River entered into
an organization known as the Trans-Missouri Freight Association. The preamble
to its articles of agreement3 announced that:
For the purpose of mutual protection by establishing and maintaining reasonable rates,
rules, and regulations on all freight traffic, both through and local, the subscribers do
hereby form an association to be known as the Trans-Missouri Freight Association, and
agree to be governed by the following provisions....
Rates were established by a committee appointed pursuant to the agreement and
any member railroad violating the established schedule of rates was subject to a
penalty. A member railroad could withdraw from the association on giving thirty
days' notice, but while a member it was bound to charge the rates fixed, under a
penalty for not doing so.
The Sherman Act became law in i89o. In 1892 action was brought by the Fed-
eral Government against the association alleging a combination for the purpose of
fixing rates, rules, and regulations for freight traffic. In 1897 the Supreme Court
held the Trans-Missouri Freight Association in violation of the Sherman Act and a
decree was entered dissolving the association and perpetually enjoining further opera-
tion of the combination
The year 1896 saw the formation of the Joint Traffic Association, composed of
railroads operating between Chicago and the eastern seaboard. It was agreed that
the association should have jurisdiction to fix rates and fares and from time to time
to change them. Each railroad, however, reserved the right to change the rates
applicable over its own lines. In the same year the Government instituted proceed-
ings, again charging a, combination for the purpose of fixing rates, rules, and
regulations for all rail traffic. This combination was declared unlawful in 1898 by
the Supreme Court and a decree was entered perpetually enjoining the practices
carried on by the association. 5
" The articles of agreement are quoted and summarized in United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight
Ass'n, 166 U. S. 290, 292 et seq. (1897).
'United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Association, x66 U. S. 290 (1897).
5 United States v. Joint Traffic Association, 171 U. S. 505 (1898).
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Between x898 and the early i930's the railroads refrained from organizing any
further combination openly to fix rates and fares or to establish rules and regulations.
A number of national organizations in the nature of trade associations were main-
tained for various purposes. Among the most important of these were:
I. The American Railway Association, which was a loose national association
having as members practically all railroads in the United States as well as railroads
in Canada and Mexico. It was organized in i891 for the purpose of handling certain
questions of general interest arising for the most part in railroad operating depart-
ments. From the time of its organization until the decision of the Supreme Court
in the Trans-Missouri case in 1897 it had jurisdiction over rates and charges; but
after that decision its by-laws expressly prohibited it from taking jurisdiction over
rates and charges. One of its most important early functions was to establish prin-
ciples for the handling of the cars of one railroad by another. It also dealt with
problems arising in connection with such matters as demurrage and standards appli-
cable to equipment. Subsequently, it fostered research and experimentation in rail-
road transportation. It functioned largely through committees composed of railroad
men expert in the specific problems with which it dealt. These committees made
a number of valuable reports that were influential in standardizing methods of opera-
tion. This assoication was also responsible for the publication of periodic reports con-
cerning condition of rolling stock, the amount of car loading, and similar statistical
and trade-reporting activities characteristic of trade associations. It had a loose organ-
ization directed by a board chosen annually from among the presidents and vice-
presidents of the member roads.
2. The Bureau of Railway Economics, which was an independent organization
supported by the railroads, managed by a director, and having for its function the
making of economic and statistical studies for use by the railroads in rate cases,
valuation cases, public relations work, and the like. It was entirely independent of
all other railroad trade associations and organizations.
3. The Railway Accounting Officers' Association, which consisted of accounting
representatives of the principal railroads of the country working under the direction
of an executive committee consisting of a comparatively small number of chief rail-
road accounting officers. It maintained a permanent secretary at Washington, D. C.,
for a great many years and studied methods for improving railroad accounting prac-
tices and for bringing them as far as possible to a uniform basis.
4. The Treasurers' Association, which was similar in organization to the Railway
Accounting Officers' Association except that it did not maintain a permanent office
nor a paid secretary. Its work was carried on through correspondence and through
annual meetings and dealt with the treasury problems of the railroads.
5. The Association of Railway Executives, which was established in 1914 to deal
with matters of common interest to all the railroads. Originally its jurisdiction was
very broad and included rate matters, but subsequently the articles of organization
were amended to prohibit the association from considering rate cases, traffic prob-
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lems, propaganda, advertising, and labor relations. Thereafter the association dealt
primarily with federal legislation and general questions of policy relating to legisla-
tion. It was a loose organization having an executive committee, which in later
years became almost obsolete, but no real directing body save an advisory committee
of about fifteen members who met from time to time at the call of the chairman. It
maintained a permanent office in Washington with a small staff consisting of the
chairman, who devoted only part of his time to the work, a general counsel, a
general solicitor, a secretary, a treasurer, and other lesser officers. The general counsel
devoted all of his time to the work of the association and was its most important
officer.6
In addition to these organizations the railroads maintained rate bureaus and con-
ferences-operating organizations-in the various rate territories. Their jurisdiction
ranged from single states or smaller units to entire sections of the country, such as
the Southeast. It is quite probable that the activities of these rate bureaus resulted
in the concerted fixing of freight rates in violation of the Sherman Act, but there
was no organization to coordinate the activities of these rate conferences on a
national scale until 1934, when the Association of American Railroads was formed.
There had been formed in 1932, however, among the railroads in the area west
of the Mississippi River, the "Commissioner Plan, Western District," under the so-
called Western Agreement administered by an officer known as the Western Com-
missioner. According to the plan, which was superimposed on the rate bureaus
operating in the West, the Western Commissioner considered controversies arising
when a railroad party to the agreement desired to inaugurate better service, improved
facilities, or lower rates, and any other party to the agreement protested against such
changes. Under the terms of the Western Agreement the changes could not be put
into effect until after notification to all parties to the agreement, and, in case of
protest and reference of the matter to the commissioner, until after formulation of a
proposed solution of the controversy by the Western Commissioner. In the event
that the commissioner's proposed solution was not accepted, the matter was referred
to a committee of directors, composed of representatives of banking and financial
interests.
Mr. W. A. Harriman, one of the organizers of the plan, has pointed out that its
purpose was to subject western railway management decisions concerning rates and
practices to review by the board of directors:
Railroad directors are charged with a duty of directing the affairs of their railroads.
They do not run the railroads-that is the duty of management. But the directors do
have the duty of formulating policies and of supervising the activities of management with
respect thereto. Policies cannot be formulated without knowledge and management can-
not be supervised without understanding.
The directors already supervised expenditures by management to a very close degree
and yet large sums could be lost in unfortunate traffic experiments or improper traffic
' State of Georgia v. The Pennsylvania Railroad Co., et a., cited supra, note i, Plaintiff's Trial Brief,
Part I, 11-13.
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policies without the matter coming to the notice of directors until after the damage was
done. With the onset of depression conditions, directors made closer and closer scrutinies
of expenditures, but were still powerless to exercise any effective supervision over policies
of rates and practices involving substantial sums.
The directors' committee created by the Commissioner plan was designed to correct
this situation. To them the Commissioner reported many of the problems which came
to him-so as to give the directors the benefit of his investigations and research. All
problems in which the recommendations of the Commissioner were not adopted came to
the committee .... In this committee of directors all personality, prejudice, and suspicion
of traffic officers was left behind, the necessity of management to uphold a subordinate did
not exist, because no president, vice president, or trustee was eligible for membership....
The committee was merely a forum for consideration and discussion, for the impact and
grinding of ideas 7
One example will show the potency of action taken by the committee of directors.
The Western Commissioner's authority was invoked when the Chicago Great
Western announced its intention to assert independent action and publish reduced
rates on packinghouse products. After hearings the commissioner concluded that
the reductions should not be made effective. This conclusion was unacceptable to
the Great Western; so the commissioner promptly reported that railroad's insub-
ordination to the committee of directors. A resolution was immediately adopted by
the committee calling upon the Great Western to reconsider and recede from its
proposed action. Shortly thereafter President Joyce of this recalcitrant railroad was
summoned to New York to discuss with a group of the committee of directors his
declination of the commissioner's decision. Later, in his annual summary, the
Western Commissioner reported:8
... As a result of the conference with the subcommittee of the Committee of Directors,
the Chicago Great Western Railroad Company indicated a willingness to abide by my
conclusions under the Commissioner Agreement, and the proposal was withdrawn.
With the experience of effective action of this nature under the Western Com-
missioner Plan as a background, the Association of American Railroads was formed.
In x933 preliminary discussions among banking and investment groups led to for-
mation of a steering committee of railroad directors (subsequently known as the
Committee of Nine) to represent stock-holding and investment interests in creating
a national organization for the collective control of railroad affairs, including, of
course, freight rates.
Concerning the need for unified authoritative control over rates, one of those
interested in forming a national organization wrote:1°
"Hearings before the Senate Interstate Commerce Committee on S. 942, 78th Cong., ist Sess. 974-
975 (1943).
' United States v. Association of American Railroads, cited supra, note x, Plaintiff's Trial Brief, Part
H, 419.
See Hearings before a Subcommitte of the Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce on S. Res.
71 of the 74th Cong., 75th Cong., and Sess., Part 23, oo5i (1938).
10United States v. Association of American Railroads, cited supra, note r, Plaintiff's Trial Brief,
Part II, 41-42.
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The necessity for a strong effective committee or organization representing the railroad
industry as a whole as opposed to the interests of individual railroads is emphasized at the
present time in connection with the weakness the railroads are showing in protecting their
rate structure....
General Atterbury of the Pennsylvania Railroad took the lead in preparing a plan
of organization to embrace all the railroads. The conception evolved by the Penn-
sylvania group was a direct and simple one. The proposal was that all existing trade
associations and rate bureaus be merged into a single, integrated, pyramid-shaped
structure with authority residing in a national organization located at the apex. Or,
as it was expressed by Mr. R. V. Fletcher, Vice-President of the Association of
American Railroads:
* . .In the spring of 1933, I found . . . a number of independent organizations which it
seemed to me might very profitably, in the interest of economy as well as of efficiency, be
consolidated into a single organization....
It always seemed to me ... it would be advisable to consolidate all these various organ-
izations into one. .. . And they were consolidated together under one head [Association
of American Railroads], under the direction and control of the board of directors. 11
Mr. Fletcher gave as a principal reason for the organization of the Association
of American Railroads the recommendation by the Federal Coordinator of Trans-
portation of the importance of a "more perfect union" among the railroads.
12
In an effort to attain the authority recognized as essential to the success of such
an arrangement, early drafts of the plan for an authoritative national association con-
tained a provision for penalizing any member who failed to follow the recommenda-
tion of the national organization or who refused to submit to compulsory arbitration
of controversial questions. More judicious counsels prevailed, because it was realized
that an express statement of compulsion was unnecessary and might attract unde-
sirable attention. This was clearly indicated in an exchange of documents between
J. L. Eysmans, assistant to General Atterbury, and John J. Pelley, who later became
President of the Association of American Railroads. Pelley wrote to the Pennsylvania:
(2) I favor compulsory arbitration. Should like to see the plan changed so as to
obligate a railroad joining the Institute to abide by the decisions of the majority of the
board of directors, or arbitrate and abide by the decisions of the board of arbitration, with
the understanding that the decisions of the board become effective immediately, adjust-
ments, if any, to be made when arbitration is concluded. For fear that some roads may
not be willing to obligate themselves for an indefinite period, the agreement might be
limited to five years.1a
Mr. Eysmans replied:
In regard to your note to the General about the reorganization: . . .As to No. 2: I
think you must read Section 6 (g) and 2z(e) together to find the "teeth." *If any road
"
1Hearings before the Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce on H. R. 2536, 79 th Cong., 2nd
Sess. 1371-1372 (1946). (Emphasis supplied.)
2 
Id. at 1372.
"8 Record before the Special Master, State of Georgia v. The Pennsylvania Railroad, et al., No. 1i-
Original, Supreme Court of the United States, October Term, 1945, State Exhibit 22. The proposed
organization was generally referred to as "the Institute."
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does not carry along with arbitration and the decisions of the Board, it must get out of
the Institute, and as there will no longer be any A. R. A. you can see it is practically
impossible for a railroad to withdraw.
This change was made because Judge Fletcher believed it would avoid the danger of
having the whole plan attacked as being a violation of the antitrust laws. This danger
would be increased by a penalty clause of this kind, which would require the railroads
to agree in advance to the imposition of fines and penalties. Furthermore, generally, the
courts hold arbitration clauses cannot be enforced by legal proceedings since the courts
are jealous of their jurisdiction and will not allow people to resort to their remedies at
law. The Judge has felt that since the penalty of disregarding a decision of the Institute,
and refusal to submit to arbitration is expulsion from the Institute, this would be sufficient
punishment without incorporating in the plan a provision which may be difficult to enforce,
and which would look bad if the United States Government should challenge the whole
set-up as being possibly in conflict with the antitrust laws.14
Even with the penalty clause omitted, the "teeth" in the form of compulsory
arbitration caused some of the planners serious apprehension of public dissatisfac-
tion and complaint. Mr. Fletcher, at the time Chief Counsel of the Association of
Railway Executives, and one who was very active in organizing the Association of
American Railroads, found it difficult to believe that a railroad which had agreed
to all the terms of the plan would thereafter in violation of its agreement refuse to
conform thereto or to arbitrate. Any railroad guilty of such a breach of "a gentleman's
agreement" would, in Fletcher's opinion, "simply be outside the pale."' " Mr. Fletch-
er's advice prevailed and the plan in final form contained merely a statement that
the members should recognize that policies announced by the new Association of
American Railroads would be authoritative and would be supported.
On September 2i, 1934, the plan was approved by a joint meeting of the member
lines of the American Railway Association and the Association of Railway Execu-
tives. The cooperation of railroad directors was assured the association through
direct liaison with the committee representing the financial interests, which stood
ready to exert its influence and the influence of its associates among directors and
substantial stockholders to compel the subordination of interests of individual rail-
roads to the dictates of group interest.
President Williamson of the New York Central expected that the activities of
the association would produce some unhappiness, but, as he observed to President
Atterbury of the Pennsylvania, all must expect in the common good "to be pinched
in places where it will hurt."16
The smaller roads were somewhat dubious of the mutual benefits to flow from
the pinching. .At least two small roads, the Bangor & Aroostook and the Wheeling
& Lake Erie, sought to join with specific provisions reserving a veto power over
association decisions affecting their respective roads. Even this limited retention of
individual initiative was rejected by the association, and Vice-President Cleveland
' i d., State Exhibit 23. The abbreviation "A. R. A." stands for American Railway Association.
' lid., State Exhibit 27.
'* Id., State Exhibit 33.
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sought to reassure the doubtful by assuring them that as far as possible his policy
would be "a cooperative one through leadership rather than through coercion."17
Significantly, he did not disavow the power to coerce in the event his leadership
should prove ineffectual. Ultimately, of course, the very power that produced their
fears compelled the small roads to join.
There followed a brief period of felicitations on the part of those forming the
new association, with the banking interests claiming a large measure of credit and
stating to Mr. Pelley that, despite the evident spirit of cooperation, cases might well
arise where divergent interests might make difficult of accomplishment measures for
"the benefit of the industry as a whole," and that the interests of the individual
roads must be subordinated to those of the whole industry. For effectuation of such
a policy, Mr. Pelley was assured of "support" and "assistance" of the financial groups
represented on the committee.'8
The background and purpose of the organization of the Association of American
Railroads is given in order that it may be seen that the private rate-making function
is merged into a single integrated structure resting at the bottom upon the regional
bureaus and their committees and bound together at the top by an association having
the authority and power to enforce its mandates by economic discipline of its mem-
bers. Mr. Pelley has admitted that the Association of American Railroads exercises
control over matters in the rate bureaus beneath it in the private rate-making
structure.'0
The Association of American Railroads has gone so far as to exercise its power
over rates even before the presentation of the request for a reduction to the railroads
originating the traffic. In 1938, Mr. Cleveland, Vice-President-Traffic, upon learning
that the Secretary of Agriculture contemplated asking for a reduction in citrus fruit
rates in order to increase consumption of the large production of that fall, wrote
southern and western railroads that "no commitments should be made by any
single origin group but that when requests are received they should be handled
collectively.... .,'o
The result was that the matter was handled from the headquarters of the Asso-
ciation of American Railroads in Washington. There was no reduction in citrus
fruit rates.
III
REGIONAL ORGANIZATION O1 RAILROAD RATE BUREAUS
There are three major freight classification territories in the United States, which
may be delineated generally as follows: official territory, east of the Mississippi River,
north of the Ohio and Potomac rivers, including most of Virginia; southern territory,
east of the Mississippi River and south of official territory; and western territory,
west of the Mississippi River. There are five major freight-rate territories. Official
11Id., State Exhibit 35. 'lid., State Exhibit 39. 19 Id., vOL. 17, p. 5813.
20 See Hearings before the Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce on H. R. 2536, 79th Cong.,
2nd Sess. 1929 (1946), for the documents pertaining to handling of the citrus fruit adjustment.
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and southern rate territories are roughly coextensive with their respective classifica-
tion territories, while western classification territory is divided into southwestern,
western trunk-line, and mountain-Pacific rate territories.
The rate bureaus have generally adapted their organization to these rate territories
and their subdivisions. Figure I shows the private rate-making machinery of the
railroads and the relation of its various parts, from the lower committees in the
operating rate bureaus at the bottom of the chart to the Association of American
Railroads, at the top. Generally, the matters considered are introduced at the bot-
tom and move upward, with authority for decision-making becoming progressively
greater with progress toward the top of the structure-the final authority being vested
in the Association of American Railroads.
To illustrate the railroad rate bureau procedure, the steps in the rate-making
procedure on a proposal involving an intraterritorial rate revision applicable in south-
ern territory will be traced through the Southern Freight Association. A proposal
for a rate change may be initiated by member rail lines or by shippers and addressed
to the chairman of the Southern Freight Association, who is also empowered to
initiate proposals. Proposals are distributed to member lines and unless one unfav-
orable response is received within a stipulated time, the Southern Freight Association
assumes the approval of the proposal by the membership.
Concurrently with submittal to the membership, the proposal is referred to the
Standing Rate Committee for investigation and recommendation. This committee,
composed of rate bureau employees and not railroad employees, is shown on Fig-
ure I at the bottom of the Southern Freight Association. Notification is given the
public of the proposed change by a bulletin and through the medium of trade pub-
lications such as the Daily Traffic Bulletin. Upon reasonable request therefor, the
chairman arranges for a public hearing if notice of the proposal has been published.
Public hearings are usually conducted by the Standing Rate Committee once each
week. Representatives of the public are allowed merely to present their views at
these hearings but are not allowed to be present when discussions are held and
decisions are made on proposals.
The articles of association provide that after the public hearing the recommenda-
tion of the Standing Rate Committee is made to the chairman of the Southern
Freight Association. An objection by this committee has the same force as that of
a member line. In practice the Standing Rate Committee may object before the
public hearing is held. If this committee or a member line does not object, the
proposal is held approved and a document called a disposition advice is issued. The
chairman is empowered to fix the date upon which the change is to become effective.
As there is no restriction on what date he may set, this power is very important. As
will be shown, the chairman wields other great powers.
However, if there is an objection by either the Standing Rate Committee or by
a member line, making up the General Freight Committee, regardless of whether
the member line is in position to handle the traffic which is the subject of the pro-
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posal to change the rates, the procedure for the disposition of the proposal is left
to the Executive Committee of the Southern Freight Association, shown a step higher
in the hierarchy on Figure I.
Although the articles of association are vague on the subject, apparently rate
changes to which one or more objections are made are considered by the General
Freight Committee, the action of which is by majority vote?' The action of this
committee is announced by the chairman. Again the chairman is given authority
to fix the effective date of the change. A member line may appeal the action of the
General Freight Committee to the Executive Committee. The chairman is charged
with the duty of appealing to the Executive Committee actions of the General
Freight Committee which he considers "inimical to the interests of the southern
carriers as a whole."
The Executive Committee's decision upon the proposed rate change is determined
by a majority of those members expressing views. A member may appeal the action
to the Traffic Executive Association-Southern Territory, another notch up in the hier-
archy. The chairman of the Southern Freight Association is charged with appealing
from the actions of the Executive Committee when he considers the decision of that
committee inimical to the interests of the southern carriers as a whole.
It should be kept in mind that the articles of association of the Southern Freight
Association provide that pending consideration by these various groups no action
shall be taken toward making the rate change effective and available for use by the
shipping public.
Appeal lies from the decision of the Traffic Executive Association-Southern Ter-
ritory to the Southeastern Presidents' Conference, thence to the Association of Amer-
ican Railroads. In view of this maze of appellate machinery to which the member
lines are bound, the right of independent action mentioned frequently in various
articles of association of the rate bureaus is of questionable value to a member bound
by the private rate-fixing system. Evidence is available that a single railroad wishing
to make a downward adjustment of rates applying entirely on its own lines has, in
the course of traversing the maze, been dissuaded from exercising its managerial dis-
cretion in lowering rates to meet the needs of shippers using that railroad. The
following case is an example of such evidence. 2
On October i, 1941, the Southern Railway submitted to the Southern Freight
Association a proposal for a reduced rate on logs from certain stations in north-
western Alabama to Alta Vista, Virginia, the entire movement being over the.linea
of the Southern Railway. The Southern Railway in its proposal stated that it felt
that the reduced rate was necessary in order to enable the logs to move from the Ala-
bama points. When the proposal was submitted by the Southern Freight Asso-
ciation to its members, the principal rail objection was predicated upon the dangerous
competitive influences that might be set in motion by the suggested arrangement.
5 1The articles of association of the various rate bureaus are on file with the Interstate Commerce
Commission and arc available for inspection by the public.
11 Record before the Special Master, supra, note 13, State Exhibit 194 et seq.
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The proposal was disapproved initially by the General Freight Committee by
majority vote. It was then appealed to the Executive Committee where it was again
disapproved by majority vote. Finally an appeal was taken to the Traffic Executive
Association-Southern Territory. On July 20, 1943, twenty-two months after the
proposal was first filed, it was stricken from the docket of the Traffic Executive
Association.
This illustration demonstrates that the power of the rate-bureau organization
to coerce, prevent, hinder, and delay the filing of rate proposals is not limited to
situations where the railroads confer upon the formation of joint rates. Here the
entire movement was over the lines of the proponent railroad; even so, its man-
agerial judgment was subjected to the concerted judgment of the other members of
the Southern Freight Association, none of whom were parties to the rate proposed.
Another important aspect of railroad rate-bureau procedure is the handling of a
revision in an interterritorial rate, that is, one applicable for the movement from
one rate-bureau jurisdiction into another. This may be illustrated by tracing the
major steps required by rate-bureau procedure when the proposed change involves
a rate change applying from southern territory to trunk-line territory, one of the
subdivisions of official territory.
The proposal is submitted for approval to the Southern Freight Association by a
rail carrier in southern territory that wishes to obtain rates for a southern producer to
allow him to ship to trunk-line territory on a basis lower than the existing rates,
which are in many cases too high to allow producers to enter the official territory
profitably. The rate-bureau procedure does not allow the rail carrier in southern
territory to negotiate directly with the official-territory lines necessary to make con-
plete routes for movement of the traffic. The proposal must conform to the rate-
bureau procedure, which requires obtaining approval of other members of the
Southern Freight Association as a first step. At the same time that the proposal is
referred to members of the Southern Freight Association, it is submitted to all three
jurisdictions in official territory-the New England, Trunk-Line, and Central Freight
Associations-for consideration, despite the fact that the rates proposed are to apply
to only one of these territories, trunk-line territory. By this procedure official-
territory railroads that do not handle the traffic vote upon the measure.
Assume that one of the three private rate-making groups, the New England
Freight Association, disapproves the proposal. The procedure of the Traffic Execu-
tive Association-Eastern Territory for handling interterritorial proposals provides
that:
Propositions shall not be considered disposed of unless action by the CFA [Central
Freight Association], TLA [Trunk-Line Association], and NEFA [New England Freight
"The rate-making subdivisions of official territory and their approximate boundaries are: New Eng-
land territory, embracing the six states generally understood to constitute New England; trunk-line terri-
tory, the area west of New England to the so-called Buffalo-Pittsburgh line, a line drawn from Buffalo
to Pittsburgh and thence following the Ohio River along the western boundary of West Virginia; and
central territory, the area west of trunk-line territory to the Mississippi River.
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Association], is uniform. When the action of the separate Official Territory jurisdictions
is otherwise, the proposition will be docketed for consideration and disposition by Joint
Conference of Official Territory lines [composed of representatives of the three official
territory rate bureaus].
The procedure of the Joint Conference of official-territory lines provides much
the same:
No general basis [of rates] shall be established in any territory unless concurred in by
the three territorial committees, and, in the event of negative action taken on a proposal
for such basis by one or more of the committees, it may be referred to the Joint Conference
for disposition. (Italics supplied.)
To obtain approval in the Joint Conference for this reduction in rates from south-
ern territory to trunk-line territory it is necessary that an affirmative vote of three-
fourths of the members present of two of the official-territory rate bureaus be ob-
tained. Under this procedure the determination of rates paid on the goods of the
southern producer is in the hands of representatives of rate territories to which the
rates are not proposed to apply. Appeal may be made to the Traffic Executive Asso-
ciation-Eastern Territory from the decisions of the Joint Conference of official-
territory lines, not by the shipper, but by railroads members of the official-territory
bureaus. The shipper has no right of appeal in the private rate-making system.
It is quite probable that one or more of the official-territory bureaus would object
to a rate from the South reduced to something near the level available to the pro-
ducers shipping within official territory, because the official lines have announced the
policy of keeping goods from the South and West competitive with those produced
on their lines from moving into official territory.24 ,
In interterritorial rate matters similar to this proposal to adjust rates from southern
territory to a subdivision of official territory, negotiations to bring the decisions of
the two territories into harmony may be carried on in the Joint Conference of Con-
tact Committees. On rate proposals affecting official, southern, southwestern, and
western trunk-line territories, the action of the territorial committees may be fol-
lowed by reference of the proposed change to the Joint Conference of Contact Com-
mittees, made up of representatives of seven private rate-making organizations: three
from the official-territory associations, and one each from Southern Freight Asso-
ciation, Western Trunk-Line Committee, Southwestern Freight Bureau, and Illinois
Freight Association. From the decision of the Joint Conference of Contact Com-
mittees, which is by majority vote, the representatives of a group may appeal to
their Traffic Executive Association. Negotiations may then take place between the
traffic executive associations.
Here is a typical example of the handling of a proposed change in an inter-
territorial rate.2 5
2"Ex parte ii6-Interterritorial Rate Bases. Before the Interstate Commerce Commission, memo-
randum brief for carriers operating in official territory, named in appendix thereof: M. B. Pierce and
others, counsel. (Washington, 1935.)
"F Record before the Special Master, supra, note 13, State Exhibit 237 et seq.
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On January 7, x943, the Southern Railway requested that an emergency proposal
be issued to the membership of the Southern Freight Association to establish rates on
-wine from Atlanta, Georgia, to points in official territory, including Illinois Freight
Association territory, on the same level as that prevailing within official territory,
stating that an Atlanta shipper was unable to market his wines in official territory
on the existing rates. The shipper complained of the fact that for minimum weights
on shipments of 50,oo and 6o,ooo pounds the rates from California terminals to
New York City were 99 cents whereas the rates from Atlanta to those same terminals
for approximately one-third of the distance were, roughly, $1.13 and $1.12.
The Southern Freight Association promptly approved the emergency proposal
and on February 5, 1943, forwarded it to the official lines. On April 14, 1944, the
emergency proposal, having consumed fourteen months pursuing the usual course
through the official-territory appellate mechanisms, met the usual fate; it was re-
jected, and this despite the fact that:
... the present shipments from Atlanta to the North and East are difficult of satisfactory
explanation. . . . While unfortified wines produced in Atlanta are not directly com-
petitive with fortified wines produced in California, the politicians constantly refer to the
fact that to New York the rates from California are less than from Atlanta... 26
Despite the refusal of the official lines to concur in eliminating this gross dis-
crimination, the southern lines independently effectuated the desired rates to Chicago
by virtue of the fact that the line of the Illinois Central served both Chicago and
the South. However, the official lines persisted in their discriminatory policy and
during the proceedings in the Class Rate case the Atlanta shipper was still com-
plaining about the rate wall between him and the consuming markets in official
territory.2
7
This attitude on the part of the official lines was aptly described by a prominent
traffic man when he stated that a similar proposal "... . met the usual fate of all inter-
territorial problems that come from the little man. It was non-concurred in very
promptly by the Official Territorial [sic] lines....
IV
PvivATE RATE-MAKING PRoCEDURE NOT IN CONFORMITY WTH E LAW
There is no question that the railroads, in the establishment of their rates, are
subject to the Sherman Act.F As has been pointed out, conspiracies among railroads
to fix freight rates have been held illegal under the Sherman ActY° Congress has
not given the Interstate Commerce Commission, nor any other group, power to
remove the making of freight rates from the prohibitions embodied in the antitrust
" [bid.
27 ld., vol. 9, P. 2640.
s Record, The States of New York, Delaware, ei al. v. United States, et al., Supreme Court of the
United States. October Term. 1946, No. 343, P. 4752.
"' United States v. Southern Pacific Co., et a., 259 U. S. 214 (1922).
"
0 United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Association, 166 U. S. 290 (1897); United States v. Joint
Traffic Association, 171 U. S. 505 (898).
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lawsO' It is also true that regulated industries are not ipso facto exempt from the
antitrust laws.3 2
In the case of Arizona Grocery Co. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway3
the Supreme Court went into the history of regulation in some detail. After noting
that the exaction of unreasonable rates by public carriers was forbidden by the com-
mon law, the court said:
But we are here specially concerned with the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 and
with some of the changes or supplements adopted since its original enactment. That act
did not take from the carriers their power to initiate rates-that is, the power in the first
instance to fix rates, or to increase or to reduce them. Skinner & Eddy Corp. v. United
States (249 U. S. 557, 564); Cincinnati, N. 0. & T. P. R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce
Comm. (162 U. S. 184, 197).34
In Texas & Pacific Railway v. United States,85 the court said:
As the carriers are in competition for the business they may, within the zone of reason-
ableness, prescribed by the statute, adjust their rates so as to obtain or retain the desired
traffic for their own lines. (Interstate Commerce Commission v. Alabama Midland Ry.
Co. (74 Fed. 715, 723-4; 168 U. S. 144, 172-3; Skinner & Eddy Corp. v. United States
(249 U. S. 557, 564); United States v. Illinois Central R. Co. (263 U. S. 515, 522).)8 0
Since 1943 Congress has several times considered legislation proposed to exempt
the railroads from the antitrust laws in the making of rates, but has refused to
enact these proposals into law3 T As lately as 1945 the Supreme Court has held, after
review of the decisions concerning railroad rate-making combinations, that "... we
can only conclude that they have no immunity from the antitrust laws."38
These decisions do not mean that railroads are entirely barred from conferring
in the making of rates. The writer, however, construes the law to mean that in the
making of local rates-those rates which apply on the lines of a single carrier-each
railroad is allowed and required to exercise its own managerial discretion free from
collaboration with, or interference by, its competitors. The Supreme Court has held
that "a carrier is entitled to initiate rates and, in this connection, to adopt such policy
of rate-making as to it seems wise."3" In initiating its local rates it would seem that
each carrier should file the rates which it considers proper with the Interstate Com-
merce Commission without being forced to submit these rates to the consideration
or approval of other railroads in the private rate-making organizations.
If for some reason the rates are not in conformity with the provisions of the
Interstate Commerce Act, proper action can be taken before the Interstate Commerce
Commission, the regulatory body authorized by law to handle such matters. To
" State of Georgia v. The Pennsylvania R. R., et al., 324 U. S. 439, 456 (1945).
"United States v. Borden Co., 308 U. S. 188, 198 (1939).
"284 U. S. 370 (1932). I' d. at 383-384. "5289 U. S. 627 (1933).
SId. at 636.
"S. 942, 78th Cong., ist Sess. (1943); H. R. 2536, 79th Cong., 2nd Sess. (946); S. xio and H. R.
221, 8oth Cong., ist Sess. (1947).
"' State of Georgia v. The Pennsylvania R. R., 324 U. S. 439, 457 (1945).
" United States v. Illinois Central R. R., 263 U. S. 515, 522 (1924).
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allow a private group to interfere with an individual railroad in the making of its
local rates, as was done in the matter of the rate on logs proposed by the Southern
Railway to apply on its own lines, is not within the contemplation of the law.
Although defenders of the present system of making rates claim that the collective
judgment of a group of railroads as to the proper rates under the Interstate Com-
merce Act is better than that of a single railroad, it has been admitted that the single
line's judgment is often superior to that of the group.4 ° It is somewhat unusual in
business relations for one's competitors to be so solicitous concerning one's compliance
with the law, and to be allowed a voice in matters for which the individual business is
legally responsible. The law apparently requires each railroad to establish its own
rates. Free from rate-bureau interference, this should be done. Such freedom of
action is further bolstered by the Supreme Court's holding that "a zone of reason-
ableness exists between maxima and minima within which a carrier is ordinarily
free to adjust its charges for itself."41  Within that zone the Interstate Commerce
Commission is powerless to grant relief even though freight rates are raised to the
maxima by a conspiracy among rail carriers4 Unless competition prevails in this
zone, the public is powerless to overcome rates pushed to the upper limits of the zone
by combinations of carriers acting through the private rate-making organizations.
One of the principal contentions of defenders of the status quo in private rate
making is that it is absolutely essential that railroads participate in the private
rate-making process in order to establish joint rates, that is, rates that apply to traffic
moving over more than one railroad between origin and destination. Further, these
advocates contend that the Department of Justice would abolish rate bureaus and
require each railroad to make its rates in a "vacuum." Such is not the position of
the Department of Justice. There is no more desire to eradicate the rate bureaus
by antitrust action than there was to put out of business, for instance, the Aluminum
Company of America when it was named defendant in an antitrust suit a few years
ago. The Federal Government merely wants the rate bureaus to conform to the
law just as other forms of business are required to do.
in other words, it is not the rate bureaus as such that the Department is opposing.
The objection is to a number of the features of the operations of the private rate-
making groups. The writer believes that the rate bureaus can change and simplify
their operations to eliminate antitrust violations without in any way hindering or
jeopardizing conformity with the Interstate Commerce Act by the carriers. The
ways in which this can be done will be pointed out in the final section of this paper.
Under section 1(4) of the Interstate Commerce Act it is "the duty of every com-
mon carrier [railroad] . . . to establish reasonable through routes with other such
carriers, and just and reasonable rates, fares, charges, and classifications applicable
thereto."" Agreement among carriers is provided for in the establishment of joint
o Record before the Special Master, supra, note 13, at 4759.
"United States v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R. R.. 294 U. S. 499, 5o6 (1935).
2 State of Georgia v. The Pennsylvania R. R., 324 U. S. 439, 461 (1945).
4354 STAT. 900, 49 U. S. C. §1(4) (1940).
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rates by section 6 4" In the words of the Supreme Court, "... it would be a per-
version of those sections to hold that they legalize a rate fixing combination ...
The collaboration contemplated in the fixing of through and joint rates is of a re-
strictive nature."45
The railroads themselves suspect that the continued operation of the private rate-
making organizations along the lines that are now being followed do not conform
to the "legitimate area in which that collaboration may operate."4 At least some of
the things that are prohibited in the process of establishing joint rates were indicated
by the court's holding that:
... we find no warrant in the Interstate Commerce Act and the Sherman Act for saying
that the authority to fix joint through rates clothes with legality a conspiracy to discrim-
inate against a State or a region, to use coercion in the fixing of rates, or to put in the
hands of a combination of carriers a veto power over rates proposed by a single carrier.4T
Defenders of private rate making point to the provision in the articles of associa-
tion of the rate bureaus which purports to guarantee each carrier the right of inde-
pendent action in the making of rates as assurance that there is no infringement on
the freedom of individual rail lines. This, of course, is an illusory right when other
provisions of the same articles to which the members subscribe provide that the indi-
vidual railroads will act, or refrain from acting, subject to the will of the majority
of the members, or the chairman, of the organization. Until the individual railroads
are allowed to act, and do in fact act, independently, private rate making will not
be free of violations of the Sherman Act.
Concerning voluntary cooperation, the alleged basis of private rate making, the
Supreme Court said, in holding the Agricultural Adjustment Act unconstitutional:
The Government asserts that whatever might be said against the validity of the plan if
compulsory, it is constitutionally sound because the end is accomplished by voluntary co-
operation. There are two sufficient answers to the contention. The regulation is not in
fact voluntary. The farmer, of course, may refuse to comply, but the price of such refusal
is the loss of benefits. The amount offered is intended to be sufficient to exert pressure
on him to agree to the proposed regulation. The power to confer or withhold unlimited
benefits is the power to coerce or destroy. If the cotton grower elects not to accept the
benefits, he will receive less for his crops; those who receive payments will be able to
undersell him. The result may well be financial ruin.... This is coercion by economic
pressure. The asserted power of choice is illusory.48
This "coercion by economic pressure" is well illustrated by the action of President
Joyce, of the Chicago Great Western, receding from a position leading to a rate
reduction on packinghouse products, after a "conference" with members of the com-
mittee of directors of the Western Commissioner Plan.
Another source of economic pressure available to bring recalcitrant railroads into
424 STAT. 380 (1887), as amended, 49 U. S. C. §5(4) (1940).
' State of Georgia v. The Pennsylvania R. R., 324 U. S. 439, 457 (1945).
,, Ibid. " Id. at 458.
'
8 United States v. Butler, 297 U. S. 1, 70, 71 (1936).
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line was testified to before a Senate committee by Mr. Sargent, President of the
Chicago & Northwestern Railway Company. He stated that the matter of divisions
(apportionments of revenue accruing to each of the carriers participating in a joint
haul) was a delicate matter for a single railroad to take to the Interstate Commerce
Commission for adjudication because "there is a tendency for a diversion of traffic"
away from lines bringing such a complaint.4 9 As freight traffic is the life blood of
the railroads, this particular kind of economic pressure is extremely effective.
V
SUGGESTIONS FOR BRINGING RATE-BuREAU PROCEDURE INTO LINE WITH
THE ANTITRUST LAws
Suggestions for changing the procedures of the private rate-making organizations
in order that their operations will comply with the antitrust laws should be of special
interest to those who maintain that the features of the present system are essential
if the railroads are to comply with the Interstate Commerce Act. If the desire to
observe the provisions of that Act is the sole motivation for maintaining the present
elaborate system of private rate-making machinery, the suggestions made here could
be acted upon without impairing observance of the Act by the carriers.
In the establishment of local rates, it has already been indicated that each railroad
should exercise its managerial discretion free from rate-bureau participation. If indi-
vidual railroads are to be free from the influence of competitors, these rates should be
filed directly with the Interstate Commerce Commission. Submitting such rates to
the rate bureaus for consideration is obviously unnecessary if each carrier is to exer-
cise the right given it under the law to initiate its own rates. Consequently, no local
rates should be handled in the rate bureaus. The service of a tariff-publishing agent
could be used for publishing these rates, but since such an agent would merely pub-
lish rates as directed by the individual lines his function should be strictly a minis-
terial one.
Notice of the action of an individual road upon filing a change in its local rates
with the Interstate Commerce Commission could be given at the time of the filing,
thereby informing other railroads and shippers of the action. Notice to the rate
bureau prior to filing would be unnecessary. Under this arrangement anyone hav-
ing a complaint against the proposed rate could, within the time allowed for such
complaints to be made, file with the Interstate Commerce Commission a request for
investigation and suspension of the rate. The Commission, under the authority
vested in it by law, could grant or deny the request for investigation and suspension.
If the request were denied, the rate would go into effect upon expiration of the
statutory period after filing unless the Commission saw fit to shorten the period as
provided by statute. If the request were granted, the matter would be set down for
hearing on the merits. This is in accordance with the regulatory process and is
"0 Hearings before Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce on S. Res. 71 of the 74th Cong., 75th
Cong., 2nd Sess. Part 3, 9966, at 9970 (1938). Mr. Joyce of the Chicago Great Western concurred in
this testimony.
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preferable, as a practical matter, to dragging the decision through committee after
committee in the private rate-making groups. The Interstate Commerce Commission
should exercise its regulatory power; that power should not be delegated to private
groups.
In the making of joint rates, as pointed out, a degree of collaboration among
railroads is permissible. No one would gainsay this right. Common sense dictates
it, the Interstate Commerce Act provides for it, and the Sherman Act does not
forbid it. But it must be remembered that, in the words of the Supreme Court, "the
collaboration contemplated in the fixing of through and joint rates is of a restrictive
nature."50
The suggestions given here comprise the writer's conception of what might be
done under this ruling of the Supreme Court in rate bureaus in the formulation of
joint rates. Local rates, of course, would not be handled in rate bureaus.
In the first place, it would be necessary to eliminate all appellate functions from
the private rate-making procedure. Using the Southern Freight Association as an
example and referring to Figure I, the executive committee would be abolished, as
would the Traffic Executive Association--Southern Territory and the Southeastern
Presidents' Conference. The rate-making functions of the Association of American
Railroads would be done away with entirely. The law does not require that any
sort of rate organization be maintained there.
The cutting away of these groups, which have been shown to be at least con-
ducive to delay, and, in many instances, to coercion of individual railroads, would
leave two functions in the regional rate bureaus. First, the function of giving tech-
nical advice on the legality of proposed rates under the Interstate Commerce Act.
Such advice would be limited to technical matters and not to matters of policy con-
cerning the desirability of a proposed rate. Second, the bureau would be a meeting
place for discussions concerning the establishment of joint rates, either intraterritorial
or interterritorial. These discussion groups should be limited to the railroads actually
participating in the traffic movement on which the joint rates are proposed to apply.
They should be further limited to exchange of information on joint rate proposals,
with no coercion or pressure being exerted upon any railroad. After discussion has
been terminated, a representative of each railroad should be free to indicate to the
publishing agent whether his railroad wishes to be included among those railroads
participating in the joint rate proposals discussed in the meeting.
These meetings for the discussion of matters pertaining to joint rates should be
open to the public, and a stenographic transcript should be made of the proceedings.
This transcript should be available for public inspection at reasonable times in the
offices of the rate bureau. Shippers, representatives of shipper groups, representatives
of regulatory and other state or Federal Government agencies, and anyone else who
might be interested in any action on joint rates handled by that bureau, would find
a complete record available for their use.
" State of Georgia v. The Pennsylvania R. R., 324 U. S. 439, 457 (1945).
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Such a procedure would be in marked contrast to the present one in which
shippers are limited to appearing and expressing their views on a rate adjustment in
which they are interested. At present the decision on the granting of a proposed rate
is made in secret by the railroads. Unless the rules of secrecy of the rate bureau
are violated by some railroad representative present, the interested shipper does not
know why the proposal was turned down, who opposed granting it, or any of the
other matters discussed in the secret meeting.
Defenders of the status quo in rate-bureau operation argue that these secret
meetings are necessary to protect the small shippers because the large shippers would,
if the meetings were open, learn the identity of carriers opposing their proposals and
would be able, by controlling the routing of large volumes of traffic, to obtain favor-
able rates for themselves. On the other hand, it is argued, small shippers have no
club of large amounts of traffic to hold over the heads of the carriers and would be
denied rates as favorable as those granted large shippers.
It is no secret in traffic circles that large shippers have no trouble at present in
obtaining favorable rates. If the publicity emanating from open discussions of joint
rates should adversely affect small shippers, the Interstate Commerce Commission
could take appropriate action to correct such abuses.
At present the chairmen of organizations such as the Southern Freight Association
exercise great powers, such as the power to appeal to a higher committee from a
decision "inimical to the interests of the carriers as a whole" and the power to estab-
lish the effective date of any rate published by the carriers in the organization.
These powers should be taken away entirely, thereby removing this threat to freedom
of action and free exercise of managerial discretion by railroads in the establishment
of their rates.
Expressed in a few words, the changes set forth would allow carriers participating
in a proposed joint rate to discuss freely the various aspects of the legality of the
rate. After full and free discussion each carrier would be free in fact to determine
whether, in the exercise of its managerial discretion, it wishes to participate in the
joint rate, or take some other course of action. There would be no appeals, either
by railroads or by the chairmen. After receiving instructions from the carriers, the
tariff-publishing agent would publish the joint rate, excluding from participation
those carriers that wish to be excluded.
A free exchange of information in regard to each joint rate proposal handled
would be allowed and encouraged. If there should be difference in opinion as to
whether a proposal contravenes the Interstate Commerce Act, the Interstate Com-
merce Commission could be called upon to adjudicate the points of disagreement.
The Commission is established to make such decisions. Its decision, everyone will
agree, is of more value than that of any series of committees part and parcel of the
present private rate-making process.
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PROPOSED LEGISLATION TO EXEMPT COMMON CARRIERS FROM THE ANTITRUST LAWS
Pending in the Eightieth Congress are S. iio, introduced by Senator Reed of
Kansas, and H. R. 221, introduced by Representative Bulwinkle of North Carolina.
These bills authorize all common carriers, and freight forwarders, to apply to the
Interstate Commerce Commission for approval of agreements concerning transporta-
tion services and charges and practices related thereto. Upon approval of an agree-
ment by the Interstate Commerce Commission, the carriers involved would be exempt
from the application of the antitrust laws. Not only the agreements under which
the rate bureaus operate would be subject to exemption from the antitrust laws, but
also any other agreements incidental to the conduct of common-carrier transportation
service.
The legislation provides, in effect, that only the agreements under which private
rate-making is carried on need be approved by the Interstate Commerce Commission;
acts performed under the agreements do not require Commission approval. Thus, if
the carriers, after approval of the agreements by the Commission giving exemption
from the antitrust laws, choose to act to hold rates to the upper level of the zone of
reasonableness, they may do so. The proposed legislation if enacted into law "would
cut the antitrust laws from the heart of our economy-the transportation industry."''"
As Professor Sharfnan has pointed out, the regulatory pattern chosen by Congress
for the railroad industry provided for competition and freedom of action for indi-
vidual railroads in the making of rates. ' The preservation of competition in rate
making is essential to conform to the long-established legislative scheme inherent in
the Interstate Commerce Act. To depart from this basic scheme by delegating to
private groups power to fix transportation rates would completely reverse the pur-
pose of the Interstate Commerce Act that rates be made through the operation of
competitive factors within the zone of reasonableness, which is bounded at the top
by the Commission's power to establish maximum rates and at the bottom by the
power to establish minimum rates.
No one acquainted with the situation can effectively deny that the purpose of
the proposed legislation is to deprive the courts of jurisdiction in the pending cases
instituted by the Department of Justice and the State of Georgia. The Department,
in the suit in the United States District Court at Lincoln, Nebraska, is endeavoring
to enjoin combinations of railroads, railroad organizations, and bankers from violat-
ing the Sherman Act. Among the offenses charged are the fixing of discriminatory
freight rates, suppressing improvements in railroad service, limiting improvement in
rail equipment and facilities, and hindering the development of forms of transporta-
tion that compete with railroads.
The suit of the State of Georgia, now being heard before Special Master Lloyd
"Sam. PEP. No. 44 to accompany S. iro, 8oth Cong., ist Sess. (1947). Individual vicws of Mr.
Tobey, at 18.2 SHARFMA-, THE INTERSTATh COMMERCE COamnSS'ON 79-81 (1931).
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K. Garrison, appointed by the Supreme Court, seeks to enjoin the principal northern
and southern railroads from fixing discriminatory and non-competitive freight rates
harmful to the economy of Georgia. In taking jurisdiction of this case, the Supreme
Court referred to the permissible area of collaboration in the making of joint rates
and stated that "we do not stop at this stage of the proceedings to delineate the
legitimate area in which that collaboration may operate.
5 3
Obviously, the Supreme Court will define the permissible area of collaboration
in handing down its decision in the Georgia case unless the case is rendered moot
by the passage of legislation. To say that transportation agencies will be unable to
establish rates in accordance with the Interstate Commerce Act if this case, or the
Government's case at Lincoln, is carried to a conclusion, is utter nonsense. There is
time enough after the Supreme Court has acted to make such assertions-if then
there is ground for such assertions to be made. If Congress sets out to amend the
antitrust laws each time a powerful group is haled into court because the defendants
anticipate that an unpalatable decision will be rendered, the legislative mill will have
available plenty of grist. For the same reason it seems a little forehanded to reverse
completely the direction of transportation policy in the United States because the
transportation industries anticipate that some restriction on their illegal activities may
result from a decision of the Supreme Court.
If either the Reed Bill or the Bulwinkle Bill should become law, a dangerous
precedent would be established. Other industries that are now seeking exemption
from the antitrust laws would be encouraged to increase their efforts. Other power-
ful groups would be invited to seek legislation immunizing them from established
laws and the power of the courts to enforce them.
Monopoly in the transportation field cannot be isolated from the operation of the
national economy, because the power to control the cost of transportation is a power
that may be used to dictate whether a business shall prosper or shall be stifled. The
proposed legislation sets a pattern for supplanting the American system of com-
petitive enterprise by a cartelization of the Nation's entire economy. The proposed
legislation should not become law.
"' State of Georgia v. The Pennsylvania R. R., 324 U. S. 439, at 457 (1945).
